cal." 3 Schelling uses this term in order to interpret the gods of mythology without understanding them as mere allegories representandeed, it is in distinction with the term "allegory," which always allos be u whereby the expression of something is not other than its reality, i.e. recognize a gruesome act if she has never before seen something the child need not have an understanding of what is occurring before her eyes-if she witnesses a savage beating, for instance-to identify t understand this scene as representative of some meaning that was already understood in of violence. The child understands the gruesome character of the event not because the act refers to or represents the gruesome, but because it tautegorically is olog is the sea, just as, for Levinas, every other is 4 As we shall see, the inverse of the above statements does not hold if these statements are read tautegorically. The "is" in tautegorical statements posits a sameness without resemblance and, counterintuitively enough, a heterogeneity rather than the homogeneity of similarity and simulacra. As an example, the batting of eyelashes a picture can be representative of a person because it looks similar to the person; or the way freshly cut grass can be representative of eyelashes, however, does not signify by representing-it does not 3 
Sämtliche Werke
Cotta 4 One is tempted to use a more radical term than "tautegory," namely, "literality." In fact, one could have just as easily entitled this paper, "Levinas on Literality." If something does not represent, allegorically depict or analogically refer to literally is the sea. Note, in this context, how Levinas lauds the literal interpretation of texts when he is speaking of -and, for all that, also the most profound one." See Emmanuel Levinas, The Levinas Reader Symposium, no. (Fall/Automne ) function as a simulacrum.
not lead to the reduction of one term to the other in the perfect symmetry of equivalency; it is an asymmetrical (i.e. not to be invertiically, and thus heterogeneously, is Levinas's account of the trace, then, corresponds to the idea of the tautegorical insofar as it repudiates all forms of homogeneity, similarity, allegory, and representation. If, as Levinas suggests, every other is is God; but God cannot is the face of the invisible God, but God is not, in turn, the visible surface of any of those faces. The face qua face is invisible, only manifested through the visibility of the trace. Levinas's trace, as tautegorical, is heterogeneous and asymmetrical, manifesting something of an entirely other order than itself. In this sense, visibility is the epiphany of the invisible, the manifestation of audibility without representation or similarity. Visibility is dissimilar to audibility.
Face and Totality: Heidegger and Levinas on the End of the World
Levinas writes, "Exp face never becomes an image or an intuition." 5 rtranscends all phenomenality and beingness and is, in this sense, 'invisible,' other than being, 'ab-solved' and 'absolute.'" 6 The face, the condition of visibility, counterintuitive as it may seem, actually transcends phenomenality. One might say that it is the invisibility of the visible. Now, whatever is utterly transcendent, whatever is not at all phenomenal, whatever escapes even the possibility of experience, simply is not. The face, however, is not invisible simpliciter; it is the invisibility of the visible. It is not something which is simply not, without a relation to what is, but it is, more precisely, "otherwise"
5 Emmanuel Levinas, parenthetically in the text as TI.
6
(Eva t mode of being. The face is not absolute in the sense that it would be destitute of any relation to being, but it is uncoupled relation or relation unrelated; it has been absolved of any phenomenal relations and, accordingly, of the possibility of functioning as a representative simulacrum. As heterogeneously dissimilar to the phenomenal and visible it cannot be its representation, though it may substitute for it. 7 Another commentator writes, "To the extent that the face is out of world, it appears in the world as naked and destitute. Naked-that is, without clothing, covering, or mask-8 To say that the face is "out of the world" is not to inscribe it in otherworldly and noumenal transcendence. This would render the face de facto Rather, the face is out of the world if and only if it appears in the world. It is not the locale that makes the face worldly or unworldly but its modus operandi. The face appears in such a way that its appearance renders it a disservice. It appears as more than-or rather otherwise than-its appearance, breaking the boundaries of, and quantitative, but in a qualitative manner by outstripping the realm of visibility. The face is out of the world because it appears as "naked and destitute." It transgresses the world, the phenomenal world, by appearing apart from categories, qualities, species, or genera. The face belongs nowhere, under no sign, no hierarchy and without representation. Yet, there is no apophaticism here, but a non-dogmatic cataphatacism. The face is not "otherworldly," but "de-worlding."
Being and Time as a "structural factor." 9 idegger, the world is the holistic, Levinas, d to parenthetically in i.e., the ego as always already standing in the place of and under the persecution of the Other, to be the condition of communication rather than communication the condition of substitution, the usage of this term in this context is meant only to connote ication that occurs prior to the communicability of representative speech acts. 12 In anxiety, one is removed from the possibilities that the world offers and returned to one's own vertiginous array of possibilities, which are latent within Da-sein itself. In the latter case of borei.e. as a holistic complex, but rather the "world" lies before one as a meaningless and inert lump, i.e. and every vocation falls on deaf ears, a lump with which there is oany interest in the world. In this state, one is not confronted with the is the fundamental comportment of Da-sein thought 13 , beings appear as brute obscenities without purpose, relation or meaning, now more faceless than ever. Only now, says rather than nothing authentically impinge itself upon us in an existential manner, rather than a merely theoretical one. In conjunction with boredom, one could also add fatigue, i.e. Sartre's nausea, and perhaps even the comical. In fatigue or nausea, the world is given as an exhausted heap-that is, as a merely contingent facticity exhausted of all its potentialities. In fatigue, the world becomes obscene, without a reason for being, i.e. a complete and utter contingency that, given its apparent meaninglessness, could just as easily not have been. Nausea and disgust ensue from fatigue because everything is "too much." Not just too much of this or that, but it is with absolutely everything that one could just as easily have done bemusement, remains, but not enjoyment, not the jouissance of 10 See Ibid 11 See Ibid.
12
The Fundamental .
13
sein, care is superseded in the later works by Gelassenheit, which, while not a lack of care, is certainly not a care that inserts itself into the world as a teleologically ordered structure.
comical, it is because we are disinterested or, as Levinas might say, "dis-inter-ested," 14 as we recognize the absurdity of the interrelated complex called "the world as a whole." Instead of one feeling disgust, however, one can do nothing but laugh. This is also why modern even to mourn for the loss of the world as a teleologically organized complex, one can either become numb and apathetic, which is but the fatigue of disgust, or one can laugh. In states in which the world becomes obscene, there is technically no experience of a "world" at all because the world is a teleologically organized complex, not the obscenity of contingent parts outside of parts, not the inertness of a technical sense, or rather the world's disarticulation, occurs when faceless lump without voice. 15 -worlding" but precisely through the of the Other that wrenches us from our engagement with the world.
It matters not that Levinas begins with our pre-pragmatic saturation in the world prior to the implementation of tools, prior to the world as a teleologically organized whole. In other words, it matters not that Levinas begins with enjoyment prior to the habituation of the home. In a clear effort to distance himself from the account of into a system" (TI,
-the disinterested joy of play." (TI, 14 Emmanuel Levinas, God, Death, and Time
15
Introduction to Metaphysics, boredom corresponds to the dis-articulation of the world into a lump, or, stated differently, the world loses rBeing and Time, however, it is the absence of the call that allows the world to remain teleologically articulated. The call disjoints, dispossesses or disarticulates one from the teleological complex of tools and the like, i.e. worldliness, in order to articulated within the complex of the world, but in one's freedom. The call brings one before the fact that possibilities are latent within their freedom and not dispersed amongst the structural character of the world. , no. (Fall/Automne ) interest in it, in order that one might ask why there is even a world at all rather than nothing whatsoever. In Levinas, however, one is removed from a play that, while enjoyable, is disinterested and not the face which demands my interest. The critical step, i.e. the moment of crisis, occurs when the face of the other somehow interrupts the world of enjoyment, our being absorbed and dissipated in disinterested play, in order to call us to attention. The face, which is not a enjoyment-that is, by wresting us from our saturation/enjoyment in the world, our "bathing in the elements," "dephasing" or "denucleating" us from our saturation in the elemental. Levinas states, "There is a coring out (dénucléation The face of the other dephases me; it is an interstice that wedges its way between me and my immediate absorption in the world. 16 inhabiting me, rather than I it, it displaces or dislocates me from the merely elemental world of play. I am, then, no longer immersed and saturated in the faceless world, in the neuter il y a, be the experience one of horror or enjoyment. Instead, I am invoked from afar, from "out of the world." As saturated within the world as my dwelling, or tion from out of the world-which, again, is not the invocation of the beyond or transcendent-does it is discourse, because it speaks to me in proximity and yet from afar, from out of the world. The face is invisible because it is not seen, but heard. 16 One should note here that Levinas speaks of the face in at least two senses, the proximate and intimate face of femininity and the remote face of masculinity, the latter of which is the face that confronts me with my ethical responsibility by calling my interest away from the world as my proper abode or dwelling. In fact, without the feminine Other as the condition of the world as a dwelling place, the world is not worldly at all, not even as abode, home, or dwelling, but the merely elemental buzzing of the il y a. The feminine face separates one from the elemental in order to bring about home, abode and the possibility of possession. I take up the discussion of whether the feminine too might be able to make an ethical demand on the Other in an article forthcoming in Parrhesia, titled "The
Symposium

The Face as Tautegorical: Against Representationalism
Let us quickly recap, in a paragraph, the tautegorical nature of the face introduced at the beginning of this article. The face does not signify through categories and attributes. Levinas describes that "a is but the thing itself. As one commentator stated it, "Unlike other signs, facial expressions signify only themselves. They do not refer to presemiotic and has no cognitive content." 17 The face i say that it reveals, nothing other than itself. A grimace, for example, is neither an allegory for pain, nor a representation of pain, nor even an indication of pain by analogy, but it si being pain. The grimace is the manifestation of pain, although pain cannot, in turn, be said to be the grimace. Asymmetry reigns here. A better example than a grimace may be a yelp; for the yelp, like the face proper, is audible rather than visible. At any rate, note that while the grimace tautegorically is pain, and while the yelp too tautegorically is pain, the grimace is not a yelp, and a yelp is not a grimace. This mmetry were operative. In any event, the face and its expression-and the face is nothing but expression-are only understandable tautegorically and so asymmetrically. Moreover, analogies, representative similitude between the two. The two terms must be simulacra instance, to say that "one's couch is as red as an apple" is to compare two things on the basis of something, redness, which is likened to both. Tautegory, however, is heterogeneous. A grimace is nothing like a pain and it is not similar to pain; it is pain. Tautegory is indeed omorphic and homogenous. It indicates nothing other than itself by being unlike itself.
Everything turns upon the nature of the copula. The "is" does not Symposium, no. (Fall/Automne ) because the subject does not exist in advance of the predicate; without the predicate, the subject simply is not. Yet, the predicate is not at all similar to the subject-it is not a representative of the subject. Of course, pain could occur through the epiphany of writhing rather than a grimace. This or that predicate is not necessary, but if it turns out to be a grimace, then the grimace bears a necessary relation to pain. On the one hand, allegories and analogies are conventional and arbitrary because other similitudes, and so other predicates, could always be employed in an effort to represent the subject under question. On the other hand, tautegory is contingent and heterogeneous, but without rendering the predicate obsolete. The sign is its its role were arbitrary in the way that one allegory or metaphor can be exchanged for another. iture that is conventionally appended to its meaning, as one presumis its meaning. In under ta is its meaning, then the face of a person is their personhood, and the person is nothing without their visible invisibility, i.e. their trace or face. Levinas states the matter as follows: essential coinciding of the iequivalent to presenting oneself as a sign, but to expressing oneself, that is, presenting o
The face tautegorically is the origin of the person insofar as it is the ida might state it, the face as trace "supplements" the origin with the trace, the origin simply is not; prior to the face as the epiphany of the person, the person simply is not. Contrary to the Cartesians, I am my body; I am not disincarnate.
Levinas writes, "Expression does not manifest the presence of being by referri i--present --what I call the "traceorigin"-does not refer to the person, but it presents, i.e. gives as epiphany, the signifying one. Signifying-eventually, in OTB, Say-ing 19 --the Said-only in order to scavenge for les mots justes, but the itself the presentation of the signifying/Saying. Tautegory is this auto-presentation of the signifying, Saying signifying itself in the Said can never say Saying, but there is only Saying at all with the know this because it is Said even though what is Said can never circumscr itself because no sign, nothing Said, can say it.
itself rather seeking representation; it stands outside all parties, in proximity, which is more than representation, is an unrepresentaace or face is ically. This is the trace's modus operandi, its way of "appearing invisiof being the transcendence of i Levinas does not tire of warning against the hypostatization of the anarchic insinuation by confusing it with an indication, with the monstration of insinuated anarchically because it is not the re-presentation of a preat all through is that which is to be Symposium, no. (Fall/Automne ) non-origin, because it only "is" through its signifying trace. One does not advance from the priority of tha i.e. a priori, but one begins always already too late, always per posterius or through the "posterior" trace, which is just as old, just as prior, as that of which it would be the trace. Levinas noting that it is "as though" the cause were older than its effect, the is not an illusion but "constitutes a positive e rate, as will be explicated more fully, without pointing to the positive presence of something given in advance of the trace, the trace is neither a mere illusion, nor a mere absence that points to nothing at all.
s, the so-called origin or, rather, the traceorigin "is glimpsed only in the third person, neither a presence nor is alterity at the furthest remove; and to be in the image of God is to stand in the trace of this illeity." 20 absolutely distant," is proximate, or intimate, but also something that speaks from out of the world. Illeity, as "neither presence nor absence," is neither cataphatic nor apophatic. Illeity is, therefore, not a mediating concept, not a middle term, but that which names the Levinas describes it this way: "The nonphenomenality of the other who affects me beyond representation, unbeknownst to me and like a thief, is the Illeity of the third person." 21 The second person addresses me in intimacy but the third, who is always present in the second before me, speaks from afar. This "alterity at the furthest remove" de-worlds and denucleates me through the intimacy of the second person, the secret immediacy of the I-Thou relation, by speaking from afar, i.e.
Begriff, Sein, this alterity is not a faceless Il of illeity, the face in every face, the invisibility of the visible, the very alterity of the Other, which detotalizes every totality. Levinas declares, "This 'thirdness' is different from that of the third man, it is the third party that interrupts the dness (le tiers in common between my neighbour and myself as the condition sine 20 (No 21 Levinas, God, Death, and Time qua non of relation and discourse. Instead, it is a rupture between I and Thou, a de-worlding breach of intimacy. Thus, the thirdness operative in illeity is not a synthesis of the two in a dialectical relation. It is the third party-i.e. another You, another face, another Other-even if this party is only present through the face of the Other before me, the third in the second, alterity in proximity. As such, this third party does not synthesize and mediate discourse; far from making dialogue possible, the third party interrupts any and all dialogue. Now, our task is not to argue for the exaltedness, dignity and even divinity of illeity, but our task is to elucidate the implications of its character as trace-origin. Our task is to elucidate the assertion that the trace tautegorically is the origin (but that, in turn, that when Levinas talks of "standing in the trace of this illeity" he apparently speaks inexactly. 22 There is not a trace "of" illeity, neither
Il and subsequently its trace. Such a conception would make the trace into a mere representation, rather than the epiphany, of the Il. To recall, for Levinas, "one would be wrong to forget [the trace's] anarchic insinuation by confusing it with an indication, with the monstration of the very originality of the origin, which makes the non-origin into an origin only post factum, or per posterius. The origin only acquires its tautegorically is this origin, a trace just as original as that of which it would be trace, a trace-origin. The locution "per posterius" is meant to indicate that the posterior trace is the condition of the very anteriority of the "origin," of that which it traces. Let Levinas again be heard concerning the posteriority of the anterior: "The After or the Effect conditions the Before or the Cause -bject's biography, as a part of who he or she is." 23 The subject only is The Trace-Origin: Unprethinkable Anteriority
As trace, the face is not the trace of a transcendent origin as Levinas ign of a hidden in the trace of that which is beyond, may we not ask whether the trace is not the trace of 'something', perhaps of a God who remains invisible. Levinas rejects any facile imputation of causality to God, so that the trace becomes the sign of a hidden God." 24 There was not ia an act of magic causality, rendered an effect or trace of itself. Rather, the trace is as old as the origin because it is the origin. The origin was never present to itself but is only traced post factum. It is not a beginning e trace of the in the subjectnotes, "The present is but the were a path or a way through which one might approach God. Instead I am adjured to turn to the [the face of the] other who stands in the trace of illeity." 25 If the origin were temporally precedent to its trace (i.e.
would be thinkable a priori (i.e. in advance per posterius, only by means of its epiphany. In other words, one can only think of the origin as something prior to its epiphany, but one cannot think it from its priority. It is only thinkable in and through its epiphany or revelation, but having become thinkable in this way, it can only be thought or posited as the absolutely prior, as the absolute prius itself, which is only thinkable per posterius sserting that "consciousness is seized without any a priori ( is revealed -concept of revelation is the concept of that which cannot be thought a priori or in advance of its epiphany, i.e. its revelatory trace. The origin simply is nought in advance of the trace; it only is, tautegorianything revealed can only give itself through ation or tautegory, and not allegorically, analogically or representatively. Its presentation is always sudden and startling because it is unforeseeable a priori i--worlding. 27 T the ve is not, apart from trace. The trace of God means the trace that is God." 28 least, one cannot say that "God is nothing but trace," or that God is ver, is that the trace is God, which cannot be inverted to mean that ce is relation is asymmetrical or heterogeneous-the trace is not a tautology. Robbins, however, is entirely correct in saying that apart from trace God simply is not. The phrase "the trace of God" does not mean rather, it means that there is God only because the trace is there as ifestation/epiphany/expression of God, namely, the one who posthumously, or post factum, appropriates the can exist as only insofar as God is not synonymous with or encapsulated by the trace itself. The trace is not the unfolding of a God given in advance. The trace is thus sudden, not the representation of a God given in 27 As a perhaps overstated suggestion, it might be argued that every attempt at a radical empiricism entails a theory of revelation as the doctrine that nothing can be known in advance of its actuality. Radical empiricists must be committed to the doctrine that something's actuality precedes its possibility, or that actus precedes potentia. 28 Robbins, Altered Reading Symposium, no. (Fall/Automne ) -into-being of the same. Shall one venture the propmeans that there is nothing behind the face or, at least, that that which is behind the face only came to be behind-the-scenes, but not in advance of the face. That "behind" the face is not a transcendence existing in advance, but that which only comes to be through its posterior, i.e. per posterius, as something irreducible to its trace just as Saying cannot be reduced to theme of what is Said. That of which the trace is trace is not unthinkable, but it is unpre ver, that does not preclude that it is post-thinkable, i.e. thinkable only through the trace, namely, post factum and per posterius immemorial, the origin that never was, has always already passed away, its reality consisting in its passing by, its end trail, its backside, its posterior, its trace. 29 con tautegorical thesis, that "thus referring to an immemorial past, the trace of the face marks and even constitutes the other's face." 30 The face of the other is not a sign, representation or analogy indicating that a person is there behind that face and within that body; one rather is are not, although they are not subsumed in their face, i.e. reducible to their appearing, their epiphany, their words or their deeds. Likewise, always already a time passed by without ever having been at some esent as the presence of a haunting absence, that which we have just missed. (This is reminiscent of how nobody can remember being achronic rather than synchronic or synoptic nature of time. Time can never be gathered into a whole because there is always a remainder, never presencing remainder, a time displaced and repressed. In The Cambridge Companion to Levinas short, the origin, so-called, is always lost, dispersed amongst its trace Saying and the Said are united in the very act of speaking in spite of their being "diachronically" related to one another. Their combination in one and the same time is possible because their difference does not produce a contradiction. The Saying and the Said are not contradictory, but incommensurable. 31 They are incommensurable because the Said, in which there is the passing, or trace, of the Other, can never encapsulate the Saying, that of which it is the epiphany. This is why Saying is irreducible to its -a trace that can never encapsulate and recollect it. This remainder is what ensures the asymmetrical character of the tautegorical. The face of the Other is God, but God, unable to be assumed without remainder and encapsulated by what the face, as a properly audible trace has e.g. "It has been written", is expressible by the present tense, "It is written," in like manbsence, its perpetual character of having right at this present moment just passed by. As tautegorical, the trace retains an "at the same time" structure, yet without falling into the simultaneity of the synchronic. The trace is the origin, but it is not synonymous with and reducible to its presence because it is not synchronic with it. Note Levinas again: "The trace of a past in a face is not the absence of a yet non-revealed, but the anarchy of what has never been present."
per posterius, the posterior functioning as the condition, albeit not encapsulation, of the prior. Although the prior is unprethinkable, it is not unthinkable; it is post-thinkable, just through through the trace.
31
Beyond Symposium, no. (Fall/Automne ) Otherwise Than Levinas: An Empty Tautegory or a Tautology --which pushes Levinas's account of the ida writes:
-to-face relation] the face is given simultaneously as expression and as speech. Not only as glance, but as the origincarnate, envelop, or signal anything other than self, soul, subjectivity, etc. Thought is speech, and is th therefore, is given "in person" and without allegory only in the face. 32 the face could hardly the point by writing:
Trace of God." A proposition which risks incompatibility with every allusion to the "very presence of God." A proposition readily converted into atheism: and if God was the effect of the trace 33 this daring proposition that God might be nothing but the effect of the trace, the anterior nothing but the consequence of the posterior, which I would like both to accept and reject, albeit not at one and the same moment, but only diachronically, or skeptically. Levinas writes that skepticism and "its refutation signify a temporality in which the instants refuse later. Now, if the term atheism, as employed in the prior quote by origin present to itself in a noumenal and transcendent world be-
32
Writing and Difference 33 Ibid.
